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COMMUNICATION WITHOUT
LEGISLATION? A CROSS-NATIONAL FIELD
EXPERIMENT ON MEMBERS OF
PARLIAMENT
Resul Umit
Do legislators communicate with constituents about affairs that they cannot legislate? An inﬂuential
literature underlines the communication of what legislators do in the legislature to their constituents.
This article questions the hypothetical link between communication and legislation. I conduct a cross-
national ﬁeld experiment on members of national parliaments (MPs) to investigate how they behave
when ordinary citizens require them to explain what they cannot legislate. Overall, the results show
that MPs are evenly responsive to explanation requests within and outside their legislative competence.
Likewise, their replies to inquiries on what they can and cannot legislate are equally quick and just as
detailed. Further analysis reveals that electoral incentives motivate MPs to account for even those
affairs that they cannot legislate. This suggests that, with regard to the content, legislators’ communi-
cative accountability may be larger than previously supposed.
Introduction
Communicating with constituents comes with the job description of a legislator. They go
all out for explaining their legislative activities to their constituents, not only because it builds
trust and creates legitimacy (Fenno 1978) but also because it helps them get re-elected
(Mayhew 1974). However, their job becomes complicated in democracies where legislators
are not responsible for all legislative activities, yet where constituents are often unaware of
the division of competences (Cutler 2004, 2008; Leo´n 2011). Questioning the link between
legislation and communication, this article analyses whether electoral incentives make legis-
lators go out of their way to explain political affairs beyond their competence.
Legislators reach out to the voters indirectly through their speech in the legislature or to
the media, and also directly by meeting many of them in their constituency and by interacting
with increasingly many more on the Internet. Normatively, this serves democracy well because
accountability requires a continuous communication between legislators and their constituents
(Mansbridge 2004). A crucial subject of this communication is the personal accounts for their leg-
islative activities that take place away from the eyes of ordinary people. This is why theorists
deﬁne in chorus ‘an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct’ (Bovens 2007: 450)
or ‘an obligation to explain . . . his or her past actions’ (Mansbridge 2003: 516) for a legislator
as any representative needs to ‘answer to another for what he does’ (Pitkin 1967: 55).1
Empirical studies of legislative behaviour conﬁrm that legislative activities are indeed the
main subject of the legislators’ communication with their constituents. Explaining is one of the
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three components of the ‘home styles’ that Fenno (1978) observes among legislators working
in their constituencies. There they provide information on and justiﬁcation for ‘what they have
done while they have been away from home’ (Fenno 1978: 136). Besides, the necessity to com-
municate explanations can also determine what they do in the legislature. Kingdon (1989
[1973]: 47–54) ﬁnds that legislators weigh their intended vote against the potential calls for
explanations in their constituency. They might refrain from voting for or against a bill if they
think they cannot meet the potential calls with the justiﬁcations they have.
The theoretical contribution of this article is to introduce the distinction between legis-
lator’s explanations of what they do and what they do not do. Compared to what we know
about the communication of the decisions within their competences, it remains untested
how legislators behave when ordinary citizens require them to explain affairs that are out of
their control. Do legislators communicate with constituents about affairs that they cannot
legislate? What (de)motivates them to do so? Answers to these questions have important
implications not only for our understanding of legislative behaviour but also for the quality
of democracy in multi-level systems.
The focus on the communication of what legislators do poses a limitation for our under-
standing of democratic accountability and legislative behaviour in political systems with more
than one level of legislative decision-making. Legislators do not have authority and responsi-
bility for all affairs at all times in an increasing number of political systems where the legislative
power is shared among legislatures at different levels. As a result, there are affairs that fall par-
tially or fully outside as well as inside what legislators can and cannot do—a distinction that
may not always be clear to ordinary citizens.
Communication without legislation may enhance the overall democratic accountability
in a political system as this could ‘offer a remedy to the otherwise opaque procedures, the
overwhelming complexity, and the difﬁcult attribution of political responsibility in decision-
making beyond the nation state’ (Rauh 2015: 118). First, teaching the people ‘what it does
not know’ is one of the classic functions of parliaments (Bagehot 2001 [1867]: 101), and legis-
lators can explain the division of competences to their constituents in order to help them learn
who is responsible. Second, legislators ‘can make us hear what otherwise we should not’
(Bagehot 2001 [1867]: 102). By providing justiﬁcations for their own position in these affairs
and by blaming the others to force them to do the same, legislators can increase the public
accountability of decisions in a political system even if they are not the ones making these par-
ticular decisions. Otherwise, a strict limitation of communication to legislation may not only
mean these opportunities would be missed, but it also may lead to shirking among the
legislators.
The empirical contribution of this study is to provide evidence from a cross-national
ﬁeld experiment on elected public ofﬁcials: 2133 members of national parliaments (MPs)
form ﬁve countries in the European Union (EU) were contacted by ﬁctitious constituents
about affairs that are now partially or fully transferred to the supranational EU level. This is
to remedy an important methodological shortcoming of the existing research—the exclusive
focus on formal channels of communication available to MPs. Earlier studies of national plenary
debates and parliamentary questions ﬁnd generally a poor communication effort in suprana-
tional affairs (Auel and Raunio 2014; Bergman et al. 2003; Garcı´a Lupato 2014; Saalfeld 2003).2
This article questions whether our existing knowledge on communicative behaviour of
national MPs in supranational affairs is biased by the exclusive focus on formal channels of
communication. Much of the communication between MPs and their constituents indeed
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takes place in an informal and interactive setting outside the parliament, but this type of com-
munication is hard to capture due to the limitations of observational methods.
Contrary to the results from the studies of the plenary debates and parliamentary ques-
tions, this article ﬁnds that national MPs do not discriminate against supranational affairs in
their communication to their constituents. The overall results show that MPs are evenly respon-
sive to explanation requests within and outside their legislative competence. Moreover, their
replies to inquiries on national versus supranational affairs are equally quick and just as
detailed. Further analysis reveals that electoral incentives motivate MPs to account for even
those affairs that they cannot legislate.
MPs and Communication Strategies
The theoretical assumptions of this study stems from the idea that political actors
behave purposefully in pursuit of their preferences (Downs 1957). MPs might pursue various
preferences while in parliament, but these all come down to one precondition: re-election
as an MP (Cain et al. 1987; Epstein 1967; Mayhew 1974; Rae 1971). Therefore, MPs strategically
choose their actions to secure their re-election. They have to choose, and they have to do so
strategically, because they compete for parliamentary seats under the constraints of scarce
resources and institutional rules.
Communication is no exception; MPs behave purposefully in their communication with
their constituents in a way that contributes to their re-election prospects. The process of
cultivating support for the election to the parliament is a discursively constituted process
(Disch 2011; Mansbridge 2003; Saward 2010; Urbinati 2006). Top-down communication
includes information, justiﬁcation, and explanations in order to educate and persuade
people to re-elect them for another term (Mansbridge 2003; Rawls 1993: 165; Urbinati
2006). However, representatives do not simply provide pure information in straightforward
monologues, they instead use ‘crafted talk’ in their communication to change the perceptions
of the citizens (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000).
Communication in this sense refers to, what Saward (2010: 10) calls, ‘the subtle and
deeper processes of constructing the represented’ in representation. It is subtle because, as
Disch (2011) argues, representatives communicate not only to inform and educate their elec-
torates, but more often and more importantly so, they communicate to manipulate the prefer-
ences of the represented for their electoral favour. This mobilises, or ‘constructs’, a group of
people around a political cause. One of the political causes that MPs strive to mobilise citizens
around is their re-election to the parliament. This makes political communication ‘competitive,
self-interested, and oriented toward winning elections’ (Disch 2011: 103). Therefore, represen-
tatives have the incentives to cultivate electoral support by communicating to their potential
voters.
Strategies in Multi-level Settings
With the increasing number of multi-level democracies, the question arises as to how
these re-election strategies are affected when constituents have multiple elected representa-
tives at different levels. No study has yet examined the effects on communication strategies
per se, but regional and federal studies on constituency service provide important insights
for further investigation. The ﬁrst of these insights is about the demand side: constituents
expect any representative to help them with their grievances without taking jurisdictional
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competences into account (Andre´ et al. 2014, 2015; Bradbury 2007). As Patzelt (2007: 64) puts
it, ‘most citizens do not bother about such distinctions. They simply turn to the most accessible
MP’ for their casework.
I theorise that constituents misdirect their calls for explanations as well, and replicate this
in a ﬁeld experiment detailed in the subsequent section. There is no indication that constitu-
ents would be more accurate with their calls for policy explanations than their calls for service.
Besides, citizens do indeed tend to have a limited knowledge of the supranational level com-
pared to domestic levels (Anderson 1998). Moreover, Saalfeld (2003) argues that the multi-level
nature of politics makes it harder not only for the citizens but also for their representatives to
locate where credit or responsibility is due. While this ambiguity could lead MPs to stay away
from communicating supranational affairs in their plenary speeches or parliamentary ques-
tions (Saalfeld 2003), I argue that it may result in completely the opposite in informal and inter-
active forms communications. Unlike in a plenary debate, MPs have to react to the
communications from their constituents in the informal and interactive forms, where misdir-
ected demands put MPs in a position to respond.
A related insight is about the supply side, which deﬁnes the electoral competition as the
main determinant for the legislators’ response to the misdirected demands. Studies on consti-
tuency service in multi-level democracies show that demands from constituents are hard to
dismiss for legislators under tougher electoral competition even when they are misdirected
(Andre´ et al. 2014, 2015; Russell and Bradbury 2007). If legislators ignore misdirected
demands, even for principled reasons such as the division of competences, they ‘might
develop a reputation for being unhelpful, and would fear an adverse effect on their personal
vote’ (Franks 2007: 39). Besides, as Cain et al. argue, ‘whereas constituents attach considerable
importance to policy making in the abstract, when it comes to evaluating their representatives,
policy considerations decline sharply, and constituent assistance and district service consider-
ations advance’ (1987: 51). Even if the subject matter might belong to the competence of
another legislator, the same constituents have a vote for each legislature.
Electoral systems generate different levels of incentives for MPs to care about their per-
sonal reputation in their constituency. In elections where voters allocate seats directly to can-
didates rather than to parties, electoral systems encourage candidates and incumbents alike to
cultivate a personal vote for themselves (Carey and Shugart 1995). Legislators put a greater
emphasis on their relationship with their constituents in these systems (Heitshusen et al.
2005) because their re-election prospects depends less on their party and more on their con-
stituents. Therefore, I expect the likelihood for a legislator to communicate affairs outside their
competence to increase with the incentives to cultivate a personal vote in their electoral
system:
Hypothesis 1: The higher the incentives to cultivate a personal vote in an electoral system, the
more likely are the MPs to communicate affairs that they cannot legislate.
The value of a vote differs for legislators, depending on the safety of their seat. As the electoral
safety of a seat decreases, each vote becomes more critical for legislators because the number
of votes separating success from failure to secure a seat also decreases. Empirical analyses of
legislative behaviour repeatedly show that MPs who only marginally won the previous election
prioritise re-election seeking activities before anything else during their time in parliament
(Cain et al. 1987; Gaines 1998; Heitshusen et al. 2005; Norton and Wood 1993). As electoral
incentives to increase their vote shares are higher for electorally insecure MPs, I expect that
MPs from electoral safe seats are more likely to ignore misdirected calls for explanations:
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Hypothesis 2: The higher the marginality of their seat, the more likely are the MPs to commu-
nicate affairs that they cannot legislate.
Finally, the two determinants of communication without legislation deﬁned above are not
mutually exclusive of each other. Incentives at the levels of electoral systems (Hypothesis 1)
and individuals (Hypothesis 2) can interact. In particular, I expect the effect of personal electoral
marginality to increase with the incentives to cultivate a personal vote in an electoral system:
Hypothesis 3: The higher the incentives to cultivate a personal vote in an electoral system, the
greater the effect of MPs’ electoral marginality on their communication without legislation.
The Cross-national Field Experiment
In order to test these expectations on the communicative behaviour of individual legis-
lators in multi-level democracies, I conduct a ﬁeld experiment on national MPs in the EU. Exper-
iments are one of the relatively new methods mushrooming in political science (for an
excellent review, see Grose 2014), and this study builds upon the earlier ﬁeld experiments
on elected ofﬁcials by introducing the cross-national aspect into the research design over
ﬁve EU Member States—Finland, France, Germany, Ireland and the UK. This selection provides
a large variety of electoral systems with highly divergent levels of personalisation. First, it
includes all major types of electoral systems (plurality, proportional and mixed).3 In addition,
there is also a variation within some of these systems. For example, while Finland and
Ireland both use open-list proportional representation systems, the former ensures proportion-
ality with an open list while the latter safeguards it with a single-transferrable vote. Similarly,
although both France and the UK use plurality voting systems, the former has a two-round
system that guarantees a majority. These electoral systems yield signiﬁcantly different levels
of incentives to cultivate a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995; Johnson and Wallack
2012). Including cases that lie at separate ends of the scoring system is an advantage of this
case selection; as Pilet et al. experienced in their own study of legislative behaviour, ‘comparing
countries with very contrasted electoral systems is extremely useful’ (2012: 369).
The case selection provides two further advantages. First, it controls for the time of
accession to the EU. This is important because, as Mattila and Raunio (2006: 442–443) show,
the opinion gap between parties and their voters is smaller in the new member states. In
this case selection, all cases classify as old member states. Second, the time period was
away from any election date. There were no elections before May 2015 in any of the cases,
which allowed data collection through ﬁeld experiment between September 2014 and April
2015. For accessibility of parliamentarians as well as for the reliability of responses, the ﬁeld
experiments can best be carried out while parliaments are in their regular working terms.
This experiment provides an opportunity to explore the communicative behaviour of
legislators in real-life settings, where constituents do not always contact the right legislator
for the right affairs. By looking at the legislator-initiated formal communications, as indeed
the existing literature on parliamentary communication of EU affairs exclusively does, we
miss much of the actual communication between MPs and their constituents taking place
outside the parliaments. This could potentially be a big miss due to the (often-misplaced)
demand factor in the informal and interactive communications. However, these types of com-
munication are hard, if ever possible, to document with observational methods of data collec-
tion. This is why the experimental design is crucial, and the importance of the research
question outweighs the costs of ﬁeld experimentation.4
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The Experimental Design
I randomly assigned members of each parliament into two groups, who received an e-
mail from a ﬁctitious constituent to their ofﬁcial e-mail address found on parliamentary web-
sites, requesting information on their work as an MP.5 Appendix D presents several tests on this
randomisation, showing the process was successful with regard to the observable character-
istics of MPs. There were two treatment groups and no control group, because a control
group who receives no e-mail and therefore reveals no behaviour is not desirable in this
design (for a similar situation, see Richardson and John 2012). The ﬁrst treatment group of par-
liamentarians (n ¼ 1068) received an e-mail with an explicit enquiry about their legislative
work on EU immigration. The second group (n ¼ 1065) received fundamentally the same
enquiry on immigration without any explicit reference to the EU immigrants. Both e-mails
mention social services, opening the opportunity—especially for the ﬁrst group—to reply
the e-mail without communicating the EU affairs. This makes it possible to analyse not only
whether the subjects respond but also how they respond. The texts in the English version
of the treatments, sent to MPs from Ireland and the UK, read as in Text Box 1.6
TEXT BOX 1
E-mails in English
From: [E-mail address of a fictitious constituent]
To: [MP’s e-mail address]
Subject: A Question on [EU / . . . ] Immigration
Dear [Addressee],
I am writing to you because I am concerned about the number of [EU / . . . ] immigrants in
[Constituency]. The number of people coming from [other European Union countries / abroad] to
live and work in our constituency is increasing and this will certainly have a negative impact on
our social services.
As one of your constituents, I would like to know if you and the parliament are doing anything to
control [EU / . . . ] immigration.
I look forward to hearing from you.
Yours sincerely,
[Fictitious Constituent]
Note: Items in bold are alternated between the two treatments whereas items in italic differed for
each MP.
In choosing the policy area and the framing for the treatments, I aimed to satisfy
three criteria. The ﬁrst was to imitate genuine communications that take place between
MPs and ordinary citizens in real life. Field experiments are generally known to yield
high external validity because interventions take place in real-life settings (De Rooij et al.
2009; Gerber and Green 2012) beside the internal validity intrinsic to all experiments. Inter-
vention itself is also important to create this validity. Immigration policy ticks the right
boxes in this sense. It is a popular policy area for both citizens and the representatives
alike, and therefore one that is discussed between the two: citizens frequently contact
their representatives about immigration (Young et al. 2005). This is also important for a
rather technical reason that subjects must ﬁnd treatments plausible for the ﬁeld experiment
to work. Owing to the popularity of the policy area in all of the case countries, I expected
that MPs must have received similar communications before and therefore that they would
ﬁnd the e-mail plausible.
122 RESUL UMIT
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [I
NS
TI
TU
T 
FU
ER
 H
OE
HE
RE
 ST
UD
IE
N]
 at
 01
:19
 27
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
I took further practical measures to ensure plausibility and to prevent revelation. Texts
were translated into the ofﬁcial languages of the parliaments by native speakers. I then
tested the texts on a number of ordinary citizens from each case country to conﬁrm the
right balance between keeping treatments the same across the languages while adopting
the language to each political system. Depending on the size of the parliaments, I created a
number of e-mail accounts.7 In order not to introduce undesirable variation, I chose typical
male names from each country and registered credible addresses with a common e-mail
service provider. I then randomly divided the e-mails into ﬁve, and sent them on 10–14
November 2014 at 2 pm local time in the case countries. Bivariate tests show that neither
the names nor the sending waves had any signiﬁcant impact as to whether MPs replied to
their e-mail. Table SI3 in Appendix D presents these tests.
The second criterion was to initiate a simple communication with a range of policy
dimensions from supranational to local in all EU Member States. Immigration as a policy
area provides important advantages for this end as well. It is a salient issue across the
member states. The free movement of European citizens within the Union is fundamental to
European integration, which is a supranational principle guaranteed by the EU law.
However, immigration of EU nationals is only a part of the overall immigration, and each
member state controls the non-EU immigration with their own legislation. Furthermore, immi-
gration is also a local issue. Constituencies attract immigration in different numbers and types
(Scho¨nwa¨lder 2013).
Finally, immigration policy offered the room for meaningful variations, a central aspect in
any experiment, with respect to the legislative competence. The treatment for the ﬁrst group,
who receive a question on EU immigration, explicitly puts them under a misdirected call to
explain what they do not do as legislators: to control EU immigration. In contrast, the second
group received a question on immigration, which covers both the EU and non-EU immigrants.
Unlike the former, because the immigration of non-EU nationals is under the control of each
Member State, and national MPs have considerably high decision-making power in this second
type. Although EU immigrants make up an important portion of foreign nationals in every
Member State, and therefore the EU dimension is crucial to answer the questions in both treat-
ments, I expect MPs are more likely to explain what they do rather than what they do not do. As
discussed above, incentives to bring up an issue outside their competence is lower in proactive
communications, as evident from the parliamentary speeches and questions in EU affairs.
Results
The replies started to arrive in a matter of an hour while it took 141 days for the latest MP
to answer their constituent’s e-mail. Eventually, just under half of MPs replied to the treat-
ments: there were 971 replies to 2133 successfully sent e-mails, amounting to 45.52%
overall response rate. This means that just over half of MPs do not respond to all e-mail inqui-
ries from their constituents. Nevertheless, this is comparatively high ﬁgure for similar audit
studies on legislators, suggesting that the measures taken to imitate genuine communications
were successful. Indeed, many MPs noted in their replies that they received similar communi-
cations before about the same issue from ‘several other constituents’.
Figure 1 shows the response rates for each parliament. It shows that the parliaments in
Germany, Finland and Ireland are all positioned very close the mean with similar rates.
However, visibly diverging from this group are the French Assemble´e Nationale with fewer
than 20% and the British House of Commons with over 70% response rate. To a certain
COMMUNICATION WITHOUT LEGISLATION 123
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [I
NS
TI
TU
T 
FU
ER
 H
OE
HE
RE
 ST
UD
IE
N]
 at
 01
:19
 27
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
extent, these patterns might be a result of the overall differences in attitudes towards e-mails
among MPs. Tellingly, for example, France was the case with highest number of e-mail failures
by far: some e-mail addresses found on the website of the Assemble´e Nationale did in fact not
exist anymore while some others were full and incapable of receiving e-mails even if they
existed. On the contrary, there were no such failures in the UK. The fact that French MPs
can hold multiple ofﬁces might also have an effect on their response rate.
FIGURE 1
Response rates
TABLE 1
Response rates by treatment and legislators’ parliament
Parliaments EU immigration Immigration Difference p-value
Finland
N ¼ 197
46.49%
N ¼ 114
44.58%
N ¼ 83
1.91 .79
France
N ¼ 509
12.10%
N ¼ 248
19.54%
N ¼ 261
–7.44 .02
Germany
N ¼ 625
43.81%
N ¼ 315
40.97%
N ¼ 310
2.84 .47
Ireland
N ¼ 163
50.56%
N ¼ 89
43.24%
N ¼ 74
7.32 .35
UK
N ¼ 639
71.19%
N ¼ 302
72.11%
N ¼ 337
–0.91 .80
All MPs
N 5 2133
45.04%
N 5 1068
46.01
N 5 1065
–0.97 .65
Notes: This table reports the results from the unpaired t-test of the replies to the treatments. The
second and third columns show the response rates to EU immigration and immigration
treatments, respectively, in each of the five national parliaments. The fourth column reports the
differences in response rates, where positive values indicate differential treatment in favour of
supranational affairs. The p-values, reported in the last column, are two-tailed and calculated
using unpaired two sample t-tests.
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Adding the dimension of treatments to the analysis, Table 1 reports the results from
unpaired t-tests. How did the explicitly supranational aspect of EU immigration affect the com-
municative behaviour of the legislators at the national level? Overall, the tests show that there
was no signiﬁcant difference across the treatment conditions. The response rates to the
question on EU immigration on the one hand and immigration on the other were almost
exactly the same, with the latter attracting less than 1% higher rate of reply (45.04% versus
46.01%, where p ¼ .65). The differences in response rates, reported in the fourth column,
are comparatively bigger at the level of individual parliaments but still statistically insigniﬁcant,
all except for France. The results suggest that members of the Assemble´e Nationale are the only
group of MPs in this study to signiﬁcantly shy away from EU affairs as they are signiﬁcantly less
likely to respond to the treatment on EU immigration (p ¼ .02).
The rates above exclude automatic replies to e-mail messages—a functionality that
several MPs use. Nevertheless, it was evident in these automatic replies how e-mails are
now an important channel of communication between MPs and their constituents. A typical
automatic reply explains that ‘e-mails are treated in the same manner and given the same pri-
ority as other forms of communication’ and that the MP is working hard to deal with huge
number of e-mails, which is claimed to be ‘as many as 400 a day’. Such a volume of communi-
cations would force MPs to prioritise their communicative behaviour as they cannot answer
every single communication, and the response rate conﬁrms that they do so.
Therefore, another way to test whether the communication of what legislators can and
cannot legislate differs signiﬁcantly is to test their priorities. In order to do so, among those MPs
who communicated back to their constituent with a reply, I compared the mean number of
days it took for the replies to arrive and the mean number of words that these replies included
in the two treatment conditions. Table 2 presents the results from these t-tests, demonstrating
that there was no statistically signiﬁcant difference across the treatment groups. This result
holds for all MPs pooled as well as MPs in individual parliaments, this time also including
the French Assemble´e Nationale.
These results may raise a concern about the strength of the treatments. Here the key
question is whether the EU aspect—the difference between the treatments—was strong
enough to produce measurable effects. Speciﬁcally, for the experimental design to be effec-
tive, the EU Treatment had to signal the legislators that they were being approached about
a matter beyond their control. It was evident in the responses that this was indeed the case.
Among those who answered the question on EU immigration, 69.6% of the MPs openly men-
tioned that they or their parliament could not control EU immigration. In their justiﬁcations,
many pointed to the EU level in general or particularly to the principle of free movement
therein. As expected, however, none of the responses to the question on immigration
suggested that the question was misdirected for jurisdictional reasons.
Determinants of Communication Without Legislation
To provide a further robustness check for the results as well as to test the theoretical
expectations above, I next turn to the causal mechanisms behind communication without
legislation. Why do legislators go out of their way to explain political affairs beyond their leg-
islative competence? To answer this question, I ﬁrst coded the responses into two categories. I
classiﬁed a legislator as Ignores EU affairs if (a) they did not reply to their constituent’s e-mail
inquiry or (b) the EU aspect was completely missing in their response even though they did
reply. I classiﬁed them as Explains EU affairs if legislators accounted for the supranational
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policies that they cannot legislate. Overall, the results show that 20.2% of legislators explain
while 79.8% ignore EU affairs. Figure 2 plots these results by the treatment conditions for
each of the ﬁve parliaments.
Table 3 presents the results from regression estimates of the legislators’ communicative
behaviour when ordinary citizens require them to explain what they cannot legislate. Because
the dependent variable is binary, i.e., ignoring (y ¼ 0) and explaining (y ¼ 1) EU affairs, and the
number of parliaments is small (n ¼ 5), I use logistic regression models with ﬁxed-effects
TABLE 2
Number of days and words by treatment and legislators’ parliament
Parliaments EU immigration Immigration Difference p-value
(a) Number of days to the reply
Finland
N ¼ 90
4.26 (11.32)
N ¼ 53
11.62 (27.62)
N ¼ 37
–7.36 .08
France
N ¼ 81
15.13 (18.72)
N ¼ 30
12.96 (21.72)
N ¼ 51
2.17 .65
Germany
N ¼ 265
10.97 (19.37)
N ¼ 138
9.14 (12.57)
N ¼ 127
1.83 .37
Ireland
N ¼ 77
4.27 (7.74)
N ¼ 45
6.50 (8.60)
N ¼ 32
–2.23 .24
UK
N ¼ 458
11.13 (16.61)
N ¼ 215
10.84 (17.95)
N ¼ 243
0.29 .86
All MPs
N 5 971
9.94 (16.73)
N 5 481
10.39 (17.65)
N 5 490
–0.46 .68
(b) Number of words in the reply
Finland
N ¼ 90
98.28 (91.60)
N ¼ 53
105.57 (106.61)
N ¼ 37
–7.28 .73
France
N ¼ 81
123.93 (111.99)
N ¼ 30
146.71 (209.91)
N ¼ 51
–22.77 .58
Germany
N ¼ 265
215.75 (207.75)
N ¼ 138
245.06 (270.85)
N ¼ 127
–29.32 .32
Ireland
N ¼ 77
164.40 (146.72)
N ¼ 45
142.69 (151.06)
N ¼ 32
21.71 .53
UK
N ¼ 458
175.85 (202.97)
N ¼ 215
168.88 (205.17)
N ¼ 243
6.97 .72
All MPs
N 5 971
174.44 (188.75)
N 5 481
179.83 (219.79)
N 5 490
–5.39 .68
Notes: This table reports the results from the unpaired t-test of (a) the number of days it took MPs
to reply to their treatment and (b) the number of words they used in their reply. The second and
third columns show the mean number for the EU Immigration and Immigration treatments,
respectively, in each of the five national parliaments. The values in brackets are the standard
deviations. The fourth column reports the differences, where positive values indicate differential
treatment in favour of supranational affairs. The p-values, reported in the last column, are two-
tailed and calculated using unpaired two sample t-tests.
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FIGURE 2
Communication of EU affairs
TABLE 3
Determinants of communication without legislation
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error
Constant –0.93 0.64 –1.30∗ 0.66
EU Treatment 0.56∗∗∗ 0.12 0.56∗∗∗ 0.12
Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote (ICPV) 0.19∗∗ 0.07 0.29∗∗∗ 0.07
Electoral Safety –0.00 0.07 0.50∗∗ 0.17
ICPV × Electoral Safety –0.13∗∗ 0.04
Covariates: MPs
District Magnitude –0.02 0.02 –0.03 0.02
Electorate (10,000s) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU Committee Member –0.18 0.22 –0.18 0.22
Female MPs –0.17 0.14 –0.19 0.14
Age –0.00 0.01 –0.00 0.01
Seniority –0.01 0.01 –0.01 0.01
Government 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19
Salience of EU –0.05 0.08 –0.07 0.08
Anti-Immigration Policy –0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05
Covariates: Parliaments
France –2.75∗∗∗ 0.46 –2.79∗∗∗ 0.46
Germany –0.43 0.42 –0.42 0.42
Ireland –0.42 0.39 –0.47 0.39
UK –0.81∗ 0.41 –0.81∗ 0.41
Model Summary
N 2064 2064
Log likelihood –957.00 –951.53
LR x2 174.20∗∗∗ 185.13∗∗∗
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.08 0.09
Notes: The dependent variable is whether the legislator ignored (y ¼ 0) or explained (y ¼ 1) the
immigration policy of the EU. Both models estimated via binomial logistic regression. The Finnish
Eduskunta is the excluded parliament.
∗p , .05 (two-tailed tests).
∗∗p , .01 (two-tailed tests).
∗∗∗p , .001 (two-tailed tests).
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approach.8 In addition to the dummy variables for the parliaments, the models include several
control variables for covariates at the level of political parties of the legislators as well as indi-
vidual level of legislators themselves.9
Model 1, the baseline model without any interaction terms, shows that the coefﬁcient
estimates for the treatment of EU Immigration and the incentives to cultivate personal vote
(ICPV) are both positive and statistically signiﬁcant. This demonstrates that constituent
inquiry and electoral system-based incentives are strong predictors of communication
without legislation. To start with the former, the legislators who received the explicit inquiry
about EU immigration (x ¼ 1), compared to those who received the inquiry on immigration
(x ¼ 0), were more likely to explain political affairs that they cannot legislate. This conﬁrms
that the noticeable differences in the bar heights between the facets of Figure 2 are indeed
signiﬁcant differences.
Figure 3 plots the effect of constituent inquiry and ICPV on the predicted probability of
communication without legislation based on Model 1. It shows that legislators are 9.4
percentage points more likely to explain affairs beyond their legislative competence if
there is an explicit constituent inquiry about these affairs. Similarly, ICPV has a signiﬁcant
effect as it roughly doubles the average probability of legislators to provide explanations.
According to Figure 3, a change from zero to ﬁve (out of possible six) in the measure of
ICPV is associated with an increase this probability from 0.12 to 0.25 percentage points.
This conﬁrms Hypothesis 1.
The results provide conditional support for the expectation about the relationship between
electoral safety of legislators and their communicative behaviour. Electoral Safety10 is not signiﬁ-
cant in Model 1, suggesting that legislators with safe seats are no less likely to explain affairs
beyond their legislative competence than legislators with electorally marginal seats. Hence,
the results do not support Hypothesis 2. However, there is support for Hypothesis 3 that incen-
tives at the level of electoral system on the one hand and individual legislators on the other are
interactive. To test whether the effect of ICPV vary with Electoral Safety, Model 2 includes an inter-
action term of these variables. Here the results show a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
FIGURE 3
Effect of constituent inquiry and ICPV on communication without legislation
Notes: This figure plots the predicted probabilities (average adjusted predictions) of
communication without legislation from the estimates in Table 3, Model 1. Vertical lines
indicate the 95% confidence interval.
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relationship. This estimate measures the difference between the effect of ICPV when Electoral
Safety is low and the effect of ICPV when Electoral Safety is high.
Figure 4 plots the marginal effect of ICPV on the outcome that legislators explain the EU
affairs to their constituents. It demonstrates that ICPV has a positive effect on the legislators’
explanation of affairs beyond their control only when Electoral Safety is low. In other words,
where electoral systems generate high levels of incentives for MPs to care about their personal
reputation in their constituency, those MPs with unsafe seats are signiﬁcantly more likely to
explain political affairs even if they are not the responsible representatives for those particular
affairs. On average, ICPV increases the probability of unsafe legislators to explain EU immigra-
tion by 4.3 percentage points while this ﬁgure is 2.5% for legislators with competitive seats and
only 0.06 for electorally safe legislators.
In the presence of this interaction, the estimated effects of the EU immigration treatment
and ICPV stay signiﬁcant. In Model 2, the direct effect of Electoral Safety becomes signiﬁcant
while staying positive, indicating that seat safety has a signiﬁcantly positive effect on communi-
cation without legislation in the absence of incentives to cultivate a personal vote. These are the
systems where legislators have the incentives to cultivate votes for their party rather than for
their personal name, such as the system electing half of the MPs to the German Bundestag.
These German MPs may not be personally responsible for EU immigration, but their political
party, as it is the case for many parties in the EU, competes for elections at all levels including
the EU level. As safest places on party lists go to the important ﬁgures in each party, it is pol-
itically meaningful that those MPs safety has a signiﬁcantly positive effect in these systems.
Conclusion
In an increasing number of democracies, legislative power is divided or shared among
legislatures at different levels. This poses a challenge to the existing understanding of
FIGURE 4
Average marginal effect of ICPV on communication without legislation, conditional on
Electoral Safety
Note: This figure plots the average marginal effects of ICPV on communication without
legislation across the range of Electoral Safety from the estimates in Table 3, Model
2. Dotted lines indicate the 95% confidence interval around the fitted line.
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communicative accountability in legislative representation—the understanding that suggests
accountability is limited to legislative authority and legislators account for what they legislate.
It is an academic challenge because we might be evaluating legislative behaviour of communi-
cation against the outdated benchmarks. More importantly, however, it is political challenge
because, if the communicative accountability is indeed strictly limited to legislative compe-
tence, dividing and sharing legislative authority might weaken the overall accountability by
creating grey areas of responsibility. As ordinary citizens are often unaware of or bemused
by these divisions of responsibility among their various representatives, it becomes harder
to locate and hold the right legislator to account.
I conducted a cross-national ﬁeld experiment on members of ﬁve national parliaments in
the EU to test the borders of legislators’ communicative accountability. The overall results
demonstrate that, in their communications with their constituents, legislators do not shy
away from affairs that they cannot legislate. MPs were no less likely to respond to constituent
inquiries in EU immigration—an area which national legislators cannot control. Likewise, their
replies to inquiries on what they can and cannot legislate were equally quick in terms of days
and just as detailed in terms of words.
At the same time, the results also suggest that about half of MPs do not respond to all e-
mail inquiries from their constituents. This was particularly pronounced in France, where fewer
than 20% of MPs sent a reply. The French MPs were also the only exception to the equal com-
munication of what they can and cannot legislate as they returned a signiﬁcantly lower
response rate for the inquiry on EU immigration. But then again, their timing and wordiness
did not differ signiﬁcantly between the treatment groups.
These results contradict the observational studies of the plenary debates and parliamen-
tary questions at the national level, which ﬁnd a generally poor communication effort in supra-
national affairs in multi-level democracies. I argued that the interactive aspect of
communication between representatives and the represented, which is missing in plenary
debates and parliamentary questions, could bias the ﬁnding of these studies. The ﬁeld exper-
imental design, which replicates genuine communications and induces electoral incentives,
proved essential in investigating why legislators would go out of their way to explain political
affairs beyond their competence.
This study also provides important new evidence about the behavioural implications of
electoral incentives for legislators in diverse settings. There is a strong support for the expec-
tations on electoral incentives as the determinants of communication without legislation.
First, compared to the treatment on immigration, the treatment on EU immigration was sig-
niﬁcantly more likely to generate explanations of EU policy on immigration although an
important portion of MPs in the former group explained the supranational policy as well.
The second source of incentives was related to the electoral systems under which legislators
compete for their re-election. MPs were signiﬁcantly more likely to disregard the legislative
competences in their communications with their constituents under the electoral systems
that create higher incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Finally, there was also a role,
albeit a conditional one, for the incentives created by electoral safety of individual
legislators. I found that MPs with unsafe seats were signiﬁcantly more likely to explain EU
immigration as long as their electoral system incentivised them to cultivate a personal
vote for their name.
The EU is a stark example of division of legislative authority among different legisla-
tures with its legislative arrangements at the supranational, national, and in some member
states regional levels. How legislators adopt to these arrangements concern the
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parliamentary representation of about half a million people in the EU. Yet this is still an
evolving system, and there are questions to be answered about whether the ﬁndings
from the EU would hold in more stable systems such as multi-level nation states.
Another viable direction is to bridge the gap between these ﬁndings on misdirected
policy inquiries and the misdirected calls for constituency work in multi-level systems. Do
the borders of legislative accountability differ between policy and constituency work?
Only future research can tell.
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NOTES
1. Emphases added.
2. Nevertheless, more recent studies show that the share of EU affairs within the plenary
debates has been increasing over time (Rauh 2015) and particularly as a result of the Euro-
zone crisis (Auel and Ho¨ing 2015; Closa and Maatsch 2014; Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra
2013).
3. Appendix C of the online supporting information presents the characteristics of interest of
this case selection.
4. This experimental design was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Vienna
with no ethical objection to conduct the study (decision number: 2014/00085). This approval
included the decision not to inform the subjects after the study. When the experiments are
on what is public; in this case, when the subjects are public ofﬁcials using their position of
ofﬁcial authority that is conferred by the people, ethical concerns are, at least relatively,
allayed. For a detailed discussion of ethics of experiments on elected ofﬁcials, see Butler
(2014: Chapter 3), McClendon (2012), or Grose (2016).
5. At the time of the experiment, there were 2221 MPs in the subject parliaments, but the fol-
lowing analysis excludes 88 observations: MPs representing constituencies for French resi-
dents overseas (11) as well as the French overseas departments and territories (27) were
excluded because the content of the communications was not appropriate for these consti-
tuencies. Moreover, I excluded unelected substitutes in France (17) as these exceptional MPs
did not have the electoral connection assumed in this analysis. Second, a further 33 MPs
were dropped unintentionally because they either had an e-mail address that immediately
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bounced back any communication or did not have an e-mail address on legislative websites
at all.
6. For treatments in other languages, see Appendix A of the online supporting information.
7. I used one account roughly per 100 parliamentary seats. For example, I created two accounts
for Eduskunta which has 200 members.
8. An alternative way of estimation with random effects instead—as Table SI5 in the supporting
information shows—yields very similar results, indicating that the results presented here are
robust across the choice of modelling.
9. I collected the data on majority of these variables from the ofﬁcial websites of the parlia-
ments and the electoral authority of each country. However, the data on the incentives to
cultivate a personal vote originate from the database created by Johnson and Wallack
(2012) while the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015) provides the data on
party positions for Salience of EU and Anti-Immigration Policy. The supporting information
includes a detailed codebook for each of these variables.
10. Following the approach developed by Heitshusen et al. (2005) for comparing electoral safety
of legislators across various electoral systems, I coded Electoral Safety as 0 for unsafe, 1 for
competitive, 2 for safe seats and treated this variable as an interval-level variable—just as I
treated ICPV. Appendix H in the supporting information shows that the results reported here
are robust to treating these variables as categorical variables as well.
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